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OPPORTUNISM AS CRUCIBLE: RETHINKING EQUITY IN VIEW OF 
RELIANCE INTERESTS AND LEGAL EVOLUTION  
 
John S. Ehrett* 
 
This Article offers and defends a nuanced definition of opportunism 
in the context of legal decision-making by differentiating between 
opportunism in the broad sense and the particularized phenomenon of 
cognizably malignant opportunism. It subsequently proceeds by developing 
a normative critique of the case for broader invocation of counter-
opportunistic equitable remedies, alongside a defense of the reliance and 
gap-filling functions performed by opportunistic actors. Centrally, I 
challenge the suggestion that the existence of opportunism in private law 
warrants a revival of the doctrines of ex post equity. I argue, instead, that 
opportunism serves an important structural purpose where the evolution of 
ex ante legal rules is concerned, and contend that while equity-oriented 
moral reasoning might serve to inform the character and construction of 
such rules, the use of equity as an ex post remedy should generally be 
rejected by judicial decision makers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Given the unavoidable limitations of the human moral imagination, 
moral norms will not always align with the structures established by law. 
This understanding, recognized from Aristotle and other ancients onward,1 
has undergirded much of the debate regarding the proper mechanisms for 
bridging the chasm between the order established by law and the order 
required by morality.  
The concept of equity—described by some commentators as second-
order law—was, at common law, one instrument used to further this 
bridging process. 2  Equity sought to prescribe distinct remedies whose 
character was contingent upon the context of the proceeding at hand, 
whereas law (strictly understood) was bound to a more formalistic 
understanding rooted in rule sets established ex ante.3 
Over time, the development of legal culture resulted in a fusion of 
courts of law and courts of equity, in which law-court judges were 
empowered to dispense equitable remedies.4 The seminal (and perpetually 
controversial) case of Riggs v. Palmer,5 which involved a murderer’s unjust 
enrichment and ultimately turned on the general equitable principle that a 
wrongdoer must not profit from his wrongdoing, exists within this tradition, 
and the dilemma it poses underlies much of the analysis to follow.6 
The workability of equity is often challenged due to its affirmation 
of ex post remedies (in lieu of reliance on ex ante frameworks).7 Equity’s 
critics argue that equity allows individual judicial discretion to take the 
place of law,8 which destabilizes reliance interests and renders the legal 
landscape indeterminate. However, some scholars have defended the use of 
                                                
1 See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 100 (Roger Crisp trans., 2000) (“[W]hat is 
equitable . . . is nevertheless just, and it is not by being a different genus that it is superior 
to justice. The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good, what is 
equitable is superior.”).  
2 See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism 1 
(Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2617413&download=yes [hereinafter Smith, Equity]. 
3 See id. at 1–2.  
4 See id. at 2. 
5 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
6 Id. at 190.  
7 See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 6. 
8 See id. at 20.  
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equity, and even argued for its expansion in cases where the dictates of 
legal and moral imperatives appear to diverge.9 
This Article critiques the general case for a revived conception of ex 
post equity, articulated most thoroughly in Professor Henry Smith’s An 
Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity,10 and argues for an alternative 
understanding of opportunism that recognizes the distinct varieties of 
opportunistic behavior. Specifically, this Article challenges the overarching 
characterization that the presence of opportunism in private law warrants 
this revival of ex post equity doctrines. Leading private-law scholars, most 
notably Professor Smith, have advocated for the broader use of ex post 
equity by judges as a needed “safety valve”11 where traditional laws offer 
purportedly inadequate remedies. The primary situation in which these 
remedies are likely to prove inadequate, according to equity’s advocates, is 
one in which agents have behaved opportunistically.12 
In contrast, this Article argues that opportunism serves a necessary 
purpose where the evolution of ex ante legal rules is concerned, and 
contends that, while the general moral goals underlying equity might serve 
to inform the character and construction of such rules, the general 
movement away from equitable decision-making as a judicial remedy 
should continue—even where opportunistic conduct is discernibly 
problematic. In short, this Article offers a tailored critique of the counter-
opportunistic case for broader invocation of equity principles alongside a 
defense of the utilitarian, gap-filling function performed by actors behaving 
opportunistically.  
Part II offers an exploration of opportunism as a concept, engaging 
with the definitions offered by Professor Smith and other scholars. This 
Article argues that opportunism, defined in such a way as to render it 
conceptually meaningful, may be described as amoral, but need not be 
understood as universally immoral. The descriptor immoral may, however, 
be rationally attached to a particular variety of opportunism that bears 
certain conceptual characteristics, which I term cognizably malignant 
                                                
9 See id. 
10 Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity (Oct. 22, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith_LawVers 
usEquity7.pdf [hereinafter Smith, Economic Analysis]. 
11 See id. at 4–5. 
12 See id. 
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opportunism (CMO). In outlining this idea of CMO, this Article suggests 
that opportunism is generally a useful descriptor. It serves as convenient 
shorthand for conduct occurring within the interstices of law, but does not 
violate the law per se: its problematic connotations, however, are best 
understood by viewing CMO as a distinct subtype of this phenomenon. 
Part III both engages with the counter-opportunistic case for equity 
and offers an alternative portrait of the development of legal rules. This 
Article suggests that ex ante structures of law should be understood by 
means of an evolutionary paradigm, and that this paradigm works against 
the idea of supplementation via equity jurisprudence. It also considers how 
an understanding of opportunism that affirms its innate utility (coupled with 
a recognition that certain forms of opportunism are more pernicious than 
others) can lead to entrenchment of efficient rules over time, which are 
grounded in generally accepted social norms. This recognition is epitomized 
within the doctrine of strict liability in Tort Law. 
The Conclusion briefly examines additional normative questions 
regarding the morality of opportunism and the role law should play in 
addressing any legal-moral disjunction. This Article ends with a proposed 
trajectory for equity jurisprudence recognizing both historical developments 
and future avenues for growth. It ultimately argues that the moral purposes 
underlying equity—and the formulation thereof advanced by its 
contemporary defenders—may be achieved by structuring ex ante rules in 
such a way as to progressively reduce the incidence of “immoral 
opportunism.” This solution offers the best balance between encouraging 
structural reliance, fostering legal evolution, and counteracting discernibly 
problematic practices.  
The stakes in this ostensibly theoretical debate are high. By 
systemically expanding the breadth of judicial discretion, the push for 
greater use of equitable remedies introduces a new, strong disincentive 
against entering into legal obligations. Moreover, the resulting decisions fail 
to generate any momentum toward reforming defective laws, since weakly 
written texts can be “fixed” ex post by individual judges. In light of this, the 
advantages of rebutting CMO via safety-valve equity do not outweigh the 
consequences. Ex ante laws, created and modified via democratic processes, 
remain preferable. Similarly, opportunism—understood in a suitably broad 
sense—may serve a neutral, or even benign, purpose. 
 
 
2016 CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW 67 
 
I. OPPORTUNISM AS CONCEPT 
Prior to weighing its relationship to law and equity, opportunism 
must be conceptually defined, and that definition must be justified. This 
task requires close consideration of embedded assumptions regarding the 
morality of conduct occurring in the shadow of legal rules and conduct 
occurring by means of such rules.13 This Part begins by first considering the 
general characterization of “opportunism” that Professor Smith advances,14 
and subsequently offering a broader construction of the term. This Part then 
considers the question of guilefulness in opportunism, as raised by Professor 
Oliver Williamson.15 These definitions of opportunism have provided the 
theoretical baseline for increased advocacy of safety-valve equitable 
remedies16: thus, scrutinizing them for internal coherence is vital. Having 
weighed the definitions suggested by these professors and found them 
wanting, this Part introduces a framework for conceptualizing CMO, which 
addresses the thorny moral and epistemological questions posed by the 
process of formulating a definition, and provides a workable baseline for 
the analysis to follow.  
A. Identifying a General Concept of Opportunism 
Professor Smith offers a definition of opportunism that warrants 
considered analysis: “Opportunism . . . often consists of behavior that is 
technically legal but is done with a view to securing unintended benefits 
from the system, and these benefits are usually smaller than the costs they 
impose on others.”17 This definition serves as the foundation of Professor 
Smith’s argument in favor of ex post equity.18 
An example serves to illustrate this: A enters into a contract with B, 
whom A knows to be gullible, and structures the terms such that A 
disproportionately reaps the benefits of the contract. B suffers from a lack of 
foresight but is legally capable of consenting to the agreement. B’s financial 
imprudence ultimately costs him his business, though the net economic 
returns to A are ultimately marginal. 
                                                
13 See id. at 4. 
14 See Smith, Equity, supra note 2. 
15 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985).  
16 See Smith, Equity, supra note 2. 
17 Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 9–10. 
18 See generally id. 
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Professor Smith’s definition of opportunism, however, contains two 
problematic assumptions: first, it assumes that there is a singular, clear, 
ascertainable intent of the system and second, it rests on an indeterminate 
standard of net benefits as its moral benchmark.19 Each of these deficiencies 
results in workability problems when opportunism is explored in light of the 
equity question.  
 First, the problem of discerning and articulating the collective intent 
of a decision-making body has been discussed at great length.20 In the 
example above, the law’s failure to shield B from A’s conduct may be 
explainable as either an incentive for individuals to engage in their own 
cost-benefit analysis prior to contracting, 21  or as a means by which 
lawmakers anticipate entrenching their self-interested plans at some future 
point. The fact that the law does not protect A sheds no light on the 
underlying past intent of those who left this lacuna in place. For purposes of 
this analysis, it suffices to note that intent cannot necessarily serve as a 
useful external referent. 
 Second, this characterization assumes that furtherance of net social 
benefits is the threshold standard for morality of conduct.22 It is additionally 
unclear whether these benefits are to be understood in purely economic 
terms—to what extent are system norms such as “due process,”23 for 
instance, quantifiable—and if not, how such benefits and costs can be 
rationally treated as commensurable. If gullible B is a historically 
incompetent manager, for instance, are B’s economic resources better put to 
use after they pass into A’s hands? B’s conduct may be reasonably 
described as immoral or undesirable by reference to a deontological ethic of 
reciprocity,24 but it is not clear that this ethic should be employed as a more 
                                                
19 See id. at 9–10. 
20 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 
869–72 (1930). 
21 See generally Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost Benefit Analysis? A Question 
(and Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135 (2008) (discussing 
the use of individual cost-benefit analysis). 
22 See generally Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10. 
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
24 See generally Deontological Ethics, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britan 
nica.com/topic/deontological-ethics (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (describing ethical theories 
that place emphasis on the relationship between duty and the morality of human actions). 
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general criterion of net social benefit (and Professor Smith’s definition does 
not endeavor to establish this). 
 Due to these inherent difficulties with Professor Smith’s definition, I 
propose an alternative general definition of opportunism: opportunism is 
self-interested behavior that is legal but unanticipated. This definition 
encompasses three key ideas: 
 
1) Behavior that is not self-interested would not inspire the loophole-
exploiting controversy on which this entire debate rests. 
Opportunism, by definition, is self-interested. 
2) Opportunism is not illegal. Illegal or fraudulent behavior is an 
express violation of ex ante rules, whereas, by definition, loopholes 
are matters to which the law does not explicitly speak either to 
sanction or to forbid.  
3) Unanticipated behavior is not equivalent to unintended behavior. 
The language of unanticipated behavior recognizes that opportunism 
arises out of unforeseen possibilities as evidenced by the bare fact 
that the behavior itself may fall within the letter, if not the spirit, of 
the law. Whereas the language of unintended behavior presumes that 
a readily comprehensible intent exists against which opportunistic 
behavior can be weighed. 
 
 Professor Smith’s general case for equity emerges from his 
attribution of certain properties to the phenomenon of opportunism25: 
 
I suggest that opportunism is behavior that is undesirable but 
that cannot be cost-effectively captured—defined, detected, 
and deterred—by explicit ex ante rulemaking. Opportunism 
is residual behavior that would be contracted away if ex ante 
transaction costs were lower. Not coincidentally, it often 
violates moral norms, which are incorporated into the ex post 
principles that deal with opportunism.26 
 
                                                
25 While many of the problematic features of opportunism Professor Smith identifies 
are analogous to the phenomenon of cognizably malignant opportunism (discussed infra), 
this Article argues that the particular features of Professor Smith’s indictment of 
opportunism do not result in a coherent construct (against which equitable remedies should 
be used).  
26 Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 9. 
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This definition of opportunism is rooted in the assumption that undesirable 
behavior—behavior that exploits loopholes within ex ante legal 
frameworks—cannot be captured cost-effectively; however, it also implies 
that such behavior will never be captured cost-effectively. 
 Note the time window within which each assumption rests: the first 
operates with a view to present conditions, while the second draws an 
inference regarding the capacity of future legal rulemaking to adequately 
address loopholes within the system. This second assumption fails to 
consider that ex ante rules exist within a dynamic process of information 
collection, reevaluation, and change. The operation of the legislative system 
over time offers a framework for the slow advance of ex ante rule tailoring 
to address loophole problems that may arise.  
 This idea of progressive rule tailoring is not merely an outgrowth of 
the deliberative process: deliberations extensive enough to address all, or 
even most, of the possible contingencies resulting from complex legislation 
would likely impose excessively high transaction costs.27 Ex ante tailoring 
need not be conceptualized as ex ante in the sense that solutions necessarily 
emerge from a deliberative or legislative process, but from review of the 
extant legal processes as they unfold through court systems on a regular 
basis. The opportunist’s systematic exploitation of loopholes, if deemed 
sufficiently undesirable by decision makers or their constituents, may be 
curtailed via changes in the law.28 
 Yet the undesirability of a particular loophole-exploiting behavior—
a foundational component of Professor Smith’s definition—is understood as 
undesirable only by virtue of its actualized effects. In order for its effects to 
be properly identified, the behavior in question must occur, be deemed 
undesirable, and be censured accordingly. This process is the pathway by 
which private law, at least in its ex ante dimension, evolves. 
 Recognizing that ex ante laws are perpetually imperfect and 
continually developing certainly does not suggest that, within a system of 
increasingly tailored ex ante rules, interstices will no longer exist. Rather, it 
correctly affirms that ex ante rules exist within an ongoing evolutionary 
                                                
27 See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 262–
66 (2007) (for an expanded discussion of transaction costs within the legislative process).  
28 See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 
80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1987) (discussing the decentralized economic gains reaped from 
the informational asymmetries inherent to insider trading).  
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process of change. Under this schema, generalized opportunism is not 
necessarily something to be rooted out or tamed (a moral evil of sorts, 
malum in se, comparable to deception or fraud), but is instead merely a 
description of a phenomenon that will necessarily exist within any system 
that endeavors to set out any ex ante rules. Strict liability in tort, as 
discussed in Part III, offers one example of a way the ex ante tailoring 
problem has been addressed: namely, the entrenchment of certain conduct 
standards that allow for greater stakeholder reliance. 
B. The Question of Opportunism and Guile 
 It may be objected at this stage of the argument that the definition of 
opportunism outlined here encompasses too broad a swath of conduct, 
including conduct not socially disadvantageous. Opportunism, as used 
colloquially, seems to suggest a cognizance of norm violation on the part of 
the individual exploiting a loophole.29 Such an understanding is epitomized 
in the formulation of opportunism advanced by Professor Williamson, 
which parallels Professor Smith’s definition, by casting opportunism as 
“self-interest seeking with guile.”30 This Article contends that a reluctance 
to include a specific definitional requirement of guilefulness or chicanery 
(comparable to the bad faith doctrines that may be invoked to impose 
damages in the sphere of Contract Law) is conceptually defensible and 
necessary to render the following discussions cogent. 
 First, it bears mentioning that Professor Smith’s definition of 
opportunism—though itself not without difficulties, as noted above—moves 
beyond Professor Williamson’s presumption of a guilefulness requirement. 
While Professor Smith’s definition refers to “unintended benefits,”31 the 
conception of intent by which he identifies opportunism is correlated with 
the intent of the extant legal structure’s architects. It does not presuppose a 
sort of economic mens rea that the opportunist must possess. In short, 
guilefulness may be a property of an actor who behaves opportunistically, 
or a descriptor of a discrete action taken, but neither Professor Smith’s 
definition nor the definition proposed here include guilefulness, understood 
on the level of a first-person perspective, as a requirement. 
                                                
29 See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
30 WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 30.  
31 Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 10. 
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 A more fundamental problem sheds light on the reason for this 
conceptual cabining. The argument that opportunism entails a certain 
cognizance of norm violation32 encounters an epistemic difficulty: for this 
cognizance to occur, the actor must be aware of the intent of the rule-maker 
at the time the action in question (the action later termed “opportunistic”) 
transpires. This motive-driven inquiry goes well beyond the scope of a 
typical mens rea analysis.33 For a finding of opportunism to hold, it requires 
establishing not simply intent to do something, but the intent to do 
something with awareness that the formulator of the system’s rules did not 
intend to permit such conduct. This is a very high conceptual bar, and one 
that renders it generally impracticable to use the term opportunism in the 
sense deployed by Professor Smith. After all, how can one feel confident 
terming any particular form of conduct opportunistic when satisfying a 
second-order intent-to-commit-normative-violation prerequisite may prove 
elusive? An alternate characterization of opportunism—one that renders the 
term a persistently meaningful descriptor at the ex post level—is warranted. 
 In short, the effort to incorporate an intent-to-commit-normative-
violation requirement into the definition of opportunism entails two 
problematic assumptions: first, an actor’s capability to consistently discern 
the underlying intent of a rule-maker and second, an ability to establish, via 
external or third-person observation, that an actor had such a capability and, 
yet, did not exercise it.34 By contrast, a definition turning on unanticipated 
consequences establishes a broader, yet more epistemologically articulable, 
understanding of opportunism, which can bind the inquiry moving forward. 
 Last, the problem of social costs must be considered. The question is 
whether an adverse imbalance between costs incurred and benefits accrued 
is a necessary component of a definition of opportunism. As suggested 
above, this immediately encounters a problem of indeterminacy. Decisions 
regarding the number and character of the stakeholders involved, which 
form the background against which such a cost-benefit analysis is situated, 
appear to stem from ultimately arbitrary judgments. For example, is A’s 
                                                
32 See id. 
33 See generally Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–06 (1994) (common law 
rule of typical mens rea requirement). 
34 Additional normative questions may also be raised at this stage: for instance, how a 
rule-maker’s expressed or unexpressed intent translates into the imposition of a moral 
obligation, and to what extent an actor several degrees removed from the rule-maker may 
be compelled to adhere to such an obligation. 
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conduct to be judged (via cost-benefit analysis) solely with respect to B’s 
interests, or should A’s conduct be assessed with respect to the particular 
industry as a whole? Or, thinking more broadly, is the entire landscape of 
the national or global economy the appropriate forum for judging the costs 
and benefits of A’s action? Thus, definitions of opportunism that hinge on 
this cost-benefit disparity are ultimately problematic: they rest on non-
standardized, embedded assumptions regarding how, and with respect to 
whom, cost-benefit analyses of economic conduct should be handled. The 
generalized definition proposed here avoids this particular theoretical 
pitfall.35 
C. Cognizably Malignant Opportunism 
 The preceding Part has offered a much broader definition of 
opportunism than those offered by Professors Smith and Williamson. The 
definition proposed above, however, seems to neglect the fact that a certain 
subset of opportunistic behavior still remains intuitively problematic. Some 
sort of substantive difference exists between seeing a unique opportunity, 
which has arisen under the law and no one else has yet identified, and 
obvious exploitation of the rule to one’s advantage. An additional ingredient 
appears present in the latter formulation, though the precise character of that 
ingredient may be challenging to ascertain. 
 Within the large umbrella of opportunism, as broadly defined above, 
discrete instances of the type of morally dubious conduct of which 
Professors Smith and Williamson speak are certainly present. This Article 
has challenged the components of their respective definitions, but as yet 
identified, no standard against which certain particularly pernicious forms 
of opportunistic conduct (heretofore described as “immoral”) may be 
challenged. 
 This Article accordingly proposes the following framework, loosely 
derived from the Kantian categorical imperative, 36  to break the 
                                                
35 None of this definitional inquiry should be read as a defense, on moral grounds, of 
individual actors’ rationales that may lie behind opportunistic practice (as defined here). 
Nor should this discussion be considered a per se indictment of the moral ends sought by 
the use of equitable remedies as counter-opportunistic measures. Indeed, certain forms of 
opportunism (as discussed infra) can still be subjected to challenge on moral grounds, 
though equitable remedies may be an ultimately unsuitable countermeasure. 
36 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
(Allen W. Wood ed., Yale University Press 1785). 
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aforementioned impasse between intuitive moral awareness and epistemic 
indeterminacy. The specific types of undesirable conduct challenged by 
Professors Smith and Williamson fall within the category of CMO. In this 
Article, I have defined CMO as follows: the use of a given legal rule to act 
in such a way that if all actors were to do likewise, the anticipated effect of 
the rule would be wholly frustrated.  
 This formulation, existing within the broader bounds of the more 
amorphous opportunism category previously outlined, sets up a four-part 
requirement for deeming conduct an instance of CMO. 
 Use of Legal Rule: A particular rule, or meaningfully interrelated set 
of rules, must exist where a charge of CMO may be leveled, i.e., there is a 
meaningful difference between a generally wrongful act and an occurrence 
of CMO. Additionally, CMO entails an affirmative act of engaging in a 
particular type of conduct—one does not accidentally manifest CMO. Using 
a rule suggests a discernible orientation of an actor’s behavior toward rule 
manipulation.  
 All Actors: This prong of the test requires an adjudicator to weigh 
the conduct of a given actor by means of a large-scale assessment. What 
would be the wide effect of a challenged behavior if all parties bound by the 
rule in question engaged in such behavior? Since individualized instances of 
conduct may be impacted by hard-to-assess contextual factors, this prong 
entails a more meta-level inference about the broad effects of a behavior 
that has hypothetically become commonplace. 
 Anticipated Effect of the Rule: This is the key prong of the test; and 
is necessary to differentiate between the broad category of arguably amoral 
opportunism previously discussed and the far more problematic CMO. 
Unanticipated conduct—all types of behavior arising under a given rule—is 
not identical to anti-anticipated conduct—the forms of unanticipated 
conduct that bear an actual relationship to the conduct norms outlined in the 
rule itself or its prefatory matter. To establish a finding of CMO, there must 
be a connection between the anticipation of the rule-makers and the active 
thwarting of this specific anticipation by the bad actor engaging in CMO. 
Note that this Article deliberately avoids using the language of intent due to 
its subjective overtones (as discussed above), whereas anticipated effects 
(invoked here) are more easily discernible from the text and legislative 
history that underpin a given rule. 
 Wholly Frustrated: Presuming that the rules governing a specific 
domain of behavior have been formed through a morally legitimate process 
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(hypothetically speaking, via democratic voting in a liberal society), moral 
and social harm likely result from a mass strategic circumvention, by self-
interested actors, of legitimate rules. In an instance of CMO, a rule is 
thwarted to achieve not just a self-interested end, but a rule-oppositional 
end. In short, the rule itself is not conceptually reconcilable with CMO 
arising thereunder.  
Consider the example of Riggs v. Palmer,37 discussed at length 
throughout Professor Smith’s analysis. Riggs featured an example38 of 
CMO in action: if all actors killed people to prevent them from changing 
their wills, the anticipated effect of having a will in the first place (the 
expression and instantiation of one’s wishes regarding postmortem disposal 
of assets) would be wholly frustrated.  
In contrast to the problems developing from CMO, benign or 
inconsequential (non-CMO) opportunism is an incidental and necessary 
effect of lawmaking; it is not a behavior perceptibly directed toward the 
actual frustration of the rule itself (an action whose anti-normative intent 
may potentially be inferred from conduct, but an action the invalidity of 
which is not contingent on such an inference). For instance, let us suppose 
that loopholes in the structure of a recently passed international financial 
regulation provision allow a clever-minded financier to take advantage of a 
newly created arbitrage opportunity. The financial regulation provision in 
question has no anticipated effect on arbitrage practices, but an opportunity 
has arisen nonetheless. This is a species of opportunism within the 
definition sketched above, but it is not a form of CMO. Even if everyone 
engaged in the practice in question, the purpose of the tax provision itself 
would not be thwarted. The presence of some unanticipated effects may be 
desirable as a means of identifying areas where the law may need to, or can, 
develop; however, contradictory effects are almost certainly undesirable. 
Both definitions of opportunism introduced by Professors Smith and 
Williamson, as discussed above, encounter difficulties due to their reliance 
on attributions of bad intent to a particular actor (the imputation of which 
may be difficult when done at an ex post interval). Conversely, conduct 
allegedly falling under the category of CMO can be weighed more 
objectively against the rule itself, by weighing the projected effects of a 
                                                
37 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).  
38 Id. at 190. 
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broad adoption of the challenged behavior against the anticipated results of 
the rule itself (hence the “cognizably” descriptor). An additional example 
may shed light on this distinction between manifestations of opportunism. 
Consider the example of a company, such as Uber or Lyft, which provides 
many of the services associated with taxi companies but is not bound by 
many of the same regulations.39 This company shall be called “Malevolent 
Motors.” Malevolent Motors, like both Uber 40  and Lyft, 41  employs 
background checks and vehicle inspections in conducting its operations 
(even though Malevolent Motors is not required to do so explicitly by 
law).42 Malevolent Motors operates within the interstices of existing ex ante 
rules, in that its conduct is self-interested and legal, but was likely 
unanticipated by rule crafters. 
Suppose that Malevolent Motors is so successful that it ultimately 
drives out the taxi industry entirely and becomes the sole provider of driver-
for-hire services in its market. Suppose further that upon attaining 
marketplace dominance, Malevolent Motors suspends its voluntary practice 
of requiring background checks and vehicle inspections and allows anyone 
to serve as drivers. 
In such a scenario, the rules binding taxi services, but not 
Malevolent Motors, have been themselves used in such a way as to wholly 
frustrate their anticipated effect (where the anticipated effect is enhanced 
vetting of drivers-for-hire).43 This latter is an instance of CMO, whereas the 
former case (Malevolent Motors’ operation alongside established taxi 
outfits, despite the fact that Malevolent Motors exists within a legal 
loophole) exemplifies more generalized opportunism. 
Given that a distinction exists between opportunism as a broad 
category and CMO in particular, one might contend that equity judgments 
                                                
39 Sam Frizell, A Historical Argument Against Uber: Taxi Regulations Are There for a 
Reason, TIME (Nov. 19, 2014), http://time.com/3592035/uber-taxi-history. 
40 Details on Safety, UBER (July 15, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/details-on-
safety/.  
41 We Go the Extra Mile For Safety, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/safety (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2016). 
42 See generally Mike Isaac, Technology: Uber’s System for Screening Drivers Draws 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/technology/uber 
s-system-for-screening-drivers-comes-under-scrutiny.html?_r=0 (discussing Uber’s and 
Lyft’s controversial background check policies).  
43 In other words, Malevolent Motors would not have been able, “but for” the existence 
of these rules, to engage in the conduct it did. 
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are uniquely suited to redress injuries resulting from CMO. A broad revival 
of equitable remedies as an anti-CMO counter, however, risks applying a 
sledgehammer where a tack hammer is more appropriate. As subsequent 
Parts will argue, the potential harms of failing to remediate specific 
instances of CMO are outweighed by the potential structural harms of 
deploying remedies untethered to ex ante rules or precedents. Later, the 
Conclusion contends that equity is best understood as an ongoing moral 
value (informing, in a normative sense, how ex ante rules are shaped by 
lawmakers) rather than as a remedial instrument for use by adjudicators. 
II. OPPORTUNISM AND THE EVOLUTIONARY CASE AGAINST EQUITY 
This Part argues that opportunism, understood in its generalized 
sense, serves an indispensable role in the evolution of law.44 There are two 
normative reasons to prefer this view of opportunism to a view that 
embraces increased use of equity and its maxims: reliance interests and 
legal gap-filling. These two reasons, while distinct, are interlinked in 
several ways. 
A. Reliance Interests 
 Reliance interests (the need for decision makers to rely on consistent 
requirements, guidelines, and restrictions) 45  underpin the conventional 
argument against equity. Ex ante legal norms must be predictable46 in order 
for rational actors to continue engaging in the commerce of ordinary life; 
arbitrariness in the administration of law works as a disincentive to action 
of any sort. Accordingly, these norms, operating with a high degree of 
continuity, are vital to ensure the flourishing of society. 
Conversely, equity (operating in an ex post capacity) reserves 
judgment of an action’s permissibility until that action has occurred and 
been challenged on account of some allegedly overriding moral principle. 
Such a standard may be justifiably accused of imprecision: Professor Smith 
                                                
44 “Law” is understood as the formal, ex ante rule structures established by decision 
makers, enforced by the state, and broadly accessible to individual actors. 
45 See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 81 (1994). 
46 See generally id. (describing the problems of a scenario in which “neither private 
parties nor Congress can rely on settled law. This . . . undermines both democratic values 
and rule-of-law values.”). 
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himself writes of “the chilling effect of ex post discretionary equity.”47 For 
those responsible for weighing possible courses of action, law is 
undoubtedly preferable to equity as an overarching scheme. The 
permissibility of particular actions (or classes of action) is generally easier 
to ascertain when laws are announced ex ante than when actions are 
subjected to judicial reevaluation (and the granting of unpredictable 
remedies) in light of relatively unfixed “equitable” standards. 
Notably, the major structural advantages identified in the following 
subsections are applicable to all forms of opportunism, including CMO. 
Where CMO is concerned, counter-opportunistic tools (namely, the 
modification of ex ante rules) exist, which need not open the door to the 
unpredictability problems associated with equitable remedies. 
B. Legal Gap-Filling 
Where recourse to ex post equity is sharply circumscribed or 
curtailed entirely, changes in the law itself may be catalyzed. Opportunism 
(broadly construed) functions as a sort of dye in the system of law that 
identifies areas where unanticipated occurrences have arisen, which may 
warrant intervention by those responsible for the crafting of law. For 
instance, in some domains, (such as Tax Law) public sentiment may weigh 
against gap-filling action where certain loopholes are concerned. This can 
operate as a barrier to change. 48  It has no bearing, however, on the 
identification of the loopholes that opportunism allows. 
In short, acts falling within the general definition of opportunism 
identify structural legal loopholes, which decision makers may choose to 
close or ignore. Where such loopholes are left open, this inaction may be 
understood, from the perspective of an individual actor making conduct 
decisions in a system where equitable safety-valves are not in place,49 as de 
facto permission to engage in the opportunistic practice. This is a factor 
weighing against a broad characterization of opportunism as always being 
undesirable.50 Therefore, decision makers may wish to allow a certain 
degree of risk and reward within the system. This does not, however, apply 
                                                
47 Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 6. 
48 See, e.g., Susannah Camic Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2683 (2013). 
49 See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 6. 
50 See id. at 10. 
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to CMO—against which alternative, punitive sanctions may be leveled via a 
process of ex ante rulemaking.  
Reliance interests and evolutionary legal processes may not always 
intersect perfectly. It bears mentioning that evolutionary developments in 
the law do implicate the aforementioned reliance interests, and they may 
potentially have a destabilizing effect on those invested in the processes 
governed by such changing laws. Such a critique is fair. However, a more 
nuanced understanding does not embrace a strict binary of equity as 
destabilizing and law as stable. Rather, it acknowledges a continuum 
between arbitrariness and predictability. An evolutionary understanding of 
law hews closer to predictability than equity does for three reasons: 
participation, deliberation, and accountability. 
Under a system in which laws evolve to rebut opportunism (or do 
not do so) as information increases, affected parties have the opportunity to 
help shape, by means of engagement with the rule crafters, the ex ante 
constraints to which they will eventually be subjected. In so doing, they 
may blunt the effects of sharp changes in legal direction (a proposed abrupt 
closing of long-existent loopholes might undergo an extension in the 
timeline for mandatory compliance), promoting greater continuity between 
pre-change and post-change states of the law. This participation in the 
process by those affected is not present in a system where judges may, 
unilaterally and without prior warning, dispense equitable remedies. 
In allocating sufficient time for debate regarding possible 
consequences of a given legal rule, lawmakers create a record of 
deliberation to which subsequent actors can look when determining the real-
world ramifications of said rule.51 The lack of an instant case or controversy 
enables rule crafters to carefully structure their attempts to limit 
opportunistic practices, diminishing the risk of entrenching bad policy via 
precedent. The deliberative process also allows for greater fact-finding 
regarding the nature and extent of loophole exploitation, rather than 
subjecting such determinations of exploitation to judicial discretion alone.52 
                                                
51 For example, legislative history keeps track of debates regarding laws. See Federal 
Legislative History: Initial Steps, Lɪʙ. Cᴏɴɢʀᴇss, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/leghist.php 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2016). 
52 Additionally, questions regarding the admissibility, or lack thereof, of evidentiary 
materials relevant to the loophole-exploitation question (as epitomized within a particular 
case) may potentially exist within a judicial proceeding. Legislative drafters are not subject 
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The standards of participation and deliberation are themselves 
bolstered by the fact that legislative decision makers are (in most cases) 
subject to the democratic process.53 This process produces incentives to 
maintain the integrity of the legal evolutionary system. Those whose 
conduct has been destabilized without sufficient justification can eventually 
punish those responsible for arbitrary treatment or bad faith decision-
making. Equity jurisprudence is not always subject to such institutional 
constraints. 
Once counter-opportunistic revisions in ex ante rules have been 
formulated, implementation must occur. This implementation is assuredly 
not costless; the costs of compliance with new ex ante rules, however, can 
be offset by the aforementioned predictability advantages. Since statutory 
texts generally have a cabining effect on the extent of courts’ equitable 
discretion,54 comparatively greater stability follows from the evolutionary 
model. 
The evolutionary alternative to equity, outlined above, has operated 
from a presumption that equity is both necessarily indeterminate and 
problematically vague. Such a presumption has not gone unanticipated in 
the work of equity’s advocates. Early on, Professor Smith offers a means of 
cabining the vision of equity, he posits: “Injunctions, the quintessential 
equitable remedy, act against named parties (and those acting in concert 
with them) and can be very finely tailored, both in their specificity and their 
breadth to the problem at hand.”55 This characterization, however, appears 
incongruous with the rationale previously identified for broader deployment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to such institutional constraints, and thus (structurally speaking) have the capacity to work 
with a greater range of informational resources. 
53 See Democracy, Mᴇʀʀɪᴀᴍ-Wᴇʙsᴛᴇʀ, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/d 
emocracy (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“A form of government in which people choose 
leaders by voting.”). 
54 Professor Plater explained: 
Where the judge believes that a statute does not serve the public interest 
in a particular case, he or she is of course free to say so, but must 
nevertheless give the law its required effect. In such cases the practical 
result of statutory enforcement, by injunction or otherwise, will often be 
a transfer of the controversy to the legislature, which is the proper 
repository of the power to promulgate statutory exemptions and 
amendments. 
See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 
524, 528 (1982). 
55 Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 23. 
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of equity principles, given that the justification of equity based on grounds 
of ex post fairness is the crux of equity’s legitimation by means of 
opportunism. If opportunism is, as supporters of equity characterize it, 
fundamentally immoral, it would appear necessary for equity to operate as a 
broad counter to this moral violation (a violation not expected from an ex 
ante perspective). The charge that such action risks a blunderbuss effect is 
seemingly unavoidable. That outcome, which is immoral, must be rejected 
broadly, irrespective of ex ante controlling principles. 
In arguing that the advantages of increased use of equity outweigh 
the structural costs imposed, Professor Smith contends that the use of equity 
can be confined to a limited domain in order to preserve reliance interests as 
much as possible.56 
 
[T]he question is whether and when equity, with its chilling 
effect, can be a more cost-effective response to S’s 
opportunism than is the ex ante precaution (and the 
alternative of no contract). . . . It makes sense for equity to 
develop proxies for the opportunities for opportunism and 
limit itself to this defined domain in order to diminish its 
chilling effect on legitimate behavior.57 
 
Drawing a parallel between ex post equitable remedies and ex ante rules 
that incorporate the moral-philosophical goals behind equitable remedies 
conflates equity as practice with equity as a normative value, the latter of 
which may inform the legal deliberations of those who craft ex ante rules.58 
The process of making law—as opposed to equity—is a process 
characterized by the predictability advantages outlined above, thus leaning 
in the direction of more reliable ex ante decision-making. For instance, the 
proscription against contracting with minors, the mentally handicapped, or 
intoxicated persons serves as an ex ante bar to a transaction. Conversely, 
under a system incorporating safety-valve equity, a transaction with such 
persons might occur and reliance interests might vest, but the transaction 
could subsequently be invalidated ex post. Though this is a clear example of 
                                                
56 See id. at 49. 
57 Id. 
58  For instance, those developing ex ante rules may choose to structure rule-
responsibility frameworks so as to mitigate inequalities in bargaining power—strict sets of 
disclosure requirements, for instance, that allow parties to enter transactions with fuller 
cognizance of the risks involved. 
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immoral CMO as outlined in Part I, it shows how equity is structurally 
problematic in a way that opportunism is not. 
A hypothetical serves to illustrate this distinction: a statute exists 
that only prevents contracting with individuals within the three categories 
outlined above (underage/handicapped/inebriated). A contracts with B at a 
time when B is emotionally unstable. A is provably cognizant of B’s 
ongoing inner turmoil. Shortly after performance has begun, B challenges 
the initial validity of the contract on the grounds that A inequitably 
exploited B’s condition of emotional instability.  
Per the definition of opportunism outlined in Part I, A behaved 
opportunistically within the bounds of the existing law. A’s conduct was 
self-interested, since A pursued A’s own interest in contracting knowing of 
B’s emotional condition. A’s conduct was legal, as B was of the age of 
majority, of sound mental health, and not intoxicated. Finally, A’s conduct 
was (probably) unanticipated by B, if not by the drafters of the relevant 
controlling statute. (This does not, however, require that A had been aware, 
at the point of acting, that A’s conduct was so unanticipated.) 
Further, suppose that the presiding judge rules that B is excused 
from performance. Such a ruling would be consonant with the anti-
opportunistic (or alternatively, anti-CMO) aims articulated as justifications 
for doing equity. However, to excuse B from performance (where the 
conceptual grounds for the excusal are specified solely ex post), would have 
substantial consequences: A, and those similarly situated, would be strongly 
incentivized to undertake expensive investigations into the general welfare 
and stability of potential contracting partners, in the hope of warding off 
any attempts to assert lack of capacity and levy charges of opportunism. No 
text-derived norm need limit the possible inequities an aggrieved claimant 
might assert before an equity-minded judge. Transaction costs would 
increase dramatically. Even then, A would lack any guarantee that A’s 
efforts might satisfy ex post scrutiny by equity-minded judges. 
An alternative does exist: the law rendering certain types of 
contracts voidable might be expanded through the legislative process to 
include contracts produced under conditions in which one party is 
displaying acute emotional instability, with enough evidence that potential 
contracting partners might be expected to reasonably apprehend its 
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presence. If this particular language is unpalatable, then the relevant 
stakeholders might progressively make revisions.59 
Suppose that the language provided is adopted into the governing 
statute. A’s opportunism (a clear instance of CMO: if all parties did 
likewise, the anticipated effect of having anti-incapacity safeguards in 
Contract Law would be thwarted) has triggered an evolution in the law, the 
need for which might have been obviated by the use of equity. Additionally, 
this evolution shapes the ex ante landscape that decision makers can 
consider prior to contracting, reducing the degree of guesswork necessitated 
by an equity-heavy system. 
A further example serves to bolster this point. Professor Smith’s 
case for equity discusses at length the problem of unintentional property 
encroachments as a justification for ex post equity. 60  Here, the strict 
application of the law may result in socially disadvantageous results, such 
as the demolition of unintentionally encroaching structures; ergo, judges 
should apply equity principles to avoid such an outcome.61  
The claim that this scenario requires resorting to equity makes two 
assumptions: it assumes that inter-party bargaining (an optimal scenario, as 
it entirely sidesteps the transaction costs incurred through employing the 
judicial process) is not possible or has failed,62 and it assumes that the laws 
governing encroachment are likely to be static. This second assumption 
touches on the crux of the evolutionary case against equity: if strict 
application of the law leads to persistently irrational and undesirable results, 
pathways for changing the substance of that law do exist.63 The existence of 
                                                
59 See discussion infra Part III for a consideration of how the “reasonableness” 
standard intersects with ex ante versus ex post considerations in the context of reliance 
interests. 
60 See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 14. 
61 It bears mention that “unintentional property encroachment” is not an example of 
CMO: the rules of property law are not affirmatively being used to act in a particular 
manner. Accordingly, this particular phenomenon does not seem germane to the problem of 
CMO that Professor Smith indicts. 
62 The Coase Theorem highlights the latent problems in this first assumption. See, e.g., 
Coltman v. Comm’r, 980 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1992) (“So long as the rule of law is 
known when parties act, the ultimate economic result is the same no matter which way the 
law has resolved the issue.”). 
63 See Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of 
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1990) (“After all, another way to avoid an 
undesirable result from the application of a general rule of law is to change the general rule 
of law.”). 
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opportunistic practices within a system can serve to highlight the need to 
make those legal changes. Additionally, it bears mentioning that such use of 
equity is likely to increase transaction costs in the long run; if problematic 
laws themselves remain unchanged and repeated recourse to the judicial 
process is required.64 
C. The Problem of Persistent Rule Exploitation 
 At this point, one might contend that legal evolution (namely, 
counter-opportunistic rule reformulation) is always, to some degree, a form 
of “kicking the can down the road.” 65  After all, the possibilities for 
exploiting modified ex ante rules are not necessarily foreclosed by the mere 
act of modification. The question is whether the dedicated CMO perpetrator 
will simply keep revising the method by which he steps outside anticipations 
of the rule-makers. 
The answer to the question of whether the possibilities for 
exploitation, even after ex ante adjustment, via CMO still remain great is 
necessarily indeterminate and circumstantial. Moreover, inquiry along these 
lines is subject to multiple intervening variables likely to stymie a systemic 
empirical investigation. As such, the direct answer to this objection depends 
on factors beyond the scope of the theoretical analysis offered here. 
Such an objection, however, entails a presupposition that the only 
relevant quality of the legal evolutionary process is its ability to directly 
stop opportunistic66 (or more narrowly, CMO) conduct—this is not the case. 
Professor Rebecca Stone, describing the phenomenology of norm 
compliance, describes “internalizers” as those whose preferences and values 
(which in turn govern conduct) are shaped by the pedagogical effect of legal 
structures:  
 
[L]egal rules speak to subjects who adopt an “internal point 
of view” towards the law—subjects who are willing to 
bracket their immediate self-interest in order to conform with 
                                                
64 See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: 
Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 
101–03 (2005) (arguing that transaction costs are a price worth paying in order to attain 
equitable outcomes). 
65  See generally Gʀᴀᴍᴍᴀʀɪsᴛ, http://grammarist.com/usage/kick-the-can-down-the-
road/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“[Kick the can down the road] means to defer conclusive 
action with a short-term solution.”).  
66 See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 24. 
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those rules . . . . [The internalizer] takes the law as having 
made certain normative determinations about what he should 
do at the second stage and he defers to those determinations 
rather than figuring them out for himself.67 
 
As legal structures change and adapt in attempts to thwart opportunistic 
conduct, the moral senses of internalizers may be calibrated in a way that 
more accurately reflects the intent and dictates of the law. Such law—a 
reflection of both the popular will as expressed through the democratic 
process, and presumptively of the rule-maker’s own intent—is honed by 
way of anti-opportunistic adjustment and clarification. As the law improves, 
the tendency of internalizers68 to comply grows stronger; this advance exists 
whether or not the new ex ante rules are successful with respect to 
opportunistic conduct itself. Equitable principles, by contrast, are less likely 
to have this effect, due to the lack of tailoring inherent in the equitable 
maxims and their contextually contingent nature. 69  Such a lack of 
consistency cuts against the characterization of equitable remedies as a 
norm within the purview of Professor Smith’s analysis: a species of remedy 
that works in unpredictable ways cannot meaningfully be described as a 
norm.70 
This assessment of net benefits does not necessitate a belief that all, 
or even most, individuals are internalizers according to Professor Stone.71 
There may well be large swaths of society (presumptively including the 
genuinely determined opportunists) who fall within Justice Holmes’s 
famous definition of “bad men,” not driven by values, but whose 
compliance with norms is inseparably intertwined with a desire to avoid 
sanctions for noncompliance.72 If even some members of society, however, 
are not bad men, but rather internalizers, the process of legal evolution has a 
                                                
67 Rebecca Stone, Economic Analysis of Contract Law from the Internal Point of View 
4–5 (Aug. 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst 
ract_id=2134463. 
68 Id. 
69 See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 40. 
70 See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 9. 
71 See generally Stone, supra note 67. 
72 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 993 (1997) 
(“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who 
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict . . . 
.”). 
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beneficial effect; namely, it triggers the greater compliance of internalizers 
with the broad set of civic values underlying the actual text of the law, 
which are more clearly expressed via evolved ex ante rules.73 
These kinds of benefits extend further still: the advantages of ex ante 
rulemaking unfold not only on the landscape of meta-norms, but also in the 
realm of pragmatic legal effects. Ex ante rules, properly designed, are 
structured in such a way that generates additional positive system 
externalities.74 Specifically, ex ante regimes legitimize punitive sanctions 
for wrongful conduct, the presence of which attaches a potentially stronger 
deterrent effect to immoral rule-breaking (or, as spelled out above, CMO) 
than may be achieved under a system of equitable remedies—including 
disgorgement. 
As a matter of practice, the focus of the equitable remedy is 
inevitably the wronged party, not the wrongdoer. 75  Given that such 
remedies operate ex post, the principle against ex post facto laws76 bars the 
possibility of certain punitive sanctions for undesirable conduct (where such 
punitive sanctions go above and beyond the disgorgement of gains reaped 
unlawfully or profits derived from such gains).77 Not only does the law 
itself not develop to enhance reliance and clarify the lawmaker’s norms 
(while at the same time cultivating positive pedagogical effects for Stone’s 
internalizers),78 the safety-valve use of equity contains an inherently weaker 
affirmative disincentive.79 The worst outcome faced by a determined bad 
man, under the safety-valve formulation, is a series of failed attempts at rule 
exploitation, for which civil remedial penalties (conceptually tied to gains 
reaped) may be levied by equity-minded judges.80 Over time, these risks 
may be calibrated and eventually rolled into the cost of business. 
                                                
73 See Stone, supra note 67. 
74 Frank Partnoy, The Timing and Source of Regulation, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 423, 
426 (2014) (noting that ex ante rules are potentially subject to externalities). 
75 See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 11. 
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
77 See Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 5 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/2013/11/the-equity-facade-of-sec-disgorgement/ 
(“It is also generally acknowledged that disgorgement cannot be used punitively, and thus 
must be limited to an amount causally connected to the alleged wrongdoing.”). 
78 Stone, supra note 67. 
79 See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 4. 
80 Holmes, supra note 72, at 995 (considering the scenario “in which equity will grant 
an injunction, and will enforce it by putting the [bad man] in prison or otherwise punishing 
him unless he complies with the order of the court”). 
 
2016 CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW 87 
 
Accordingly, expanding the use of equitable remedies strikes a less decisive 
blow to the immoral (CMO) conduct that an equity-minded judge seeks to 
prevent.81 
Ex ante rules, by contrast, offer a more conceptually legitimate 
framework to which punitive, non-disgorgement sanctions can be attached 
as conduct incentives.82 Even if a similar form of risk calibration develops 
on the part of the immoral opportunist, ex ante rules allow for a connection 
between specific rule violations and specific sanctions. 83  Stronger 
disincentives against rule violation exist in a system without equitable 
safety valves—such valves may ameliorate harm to the one exploited, yet 
fail to sting the exploiter. Where net social costs are concerned, this 
enhanced disincentive effect encompasses the remedial advantages 
envisioned in a safety-valve model84 while also allowing for a maximally 
deterrent stick.85 
To illustrate this, reconsider the example of A and B above.86 
Suppose that the legal regime put in place—treating contracts as void in 
which one party suffers from emotional instability, as evidenced such that 
potential contracting partners might be expected to reasonably apprehend its 
presence—is supplemented by an additional prong. This prong notes that 
violations of this section create a cause of action by which the aggrieved 
party may recover punitive damages.87 A now not only knows exactly what 
is expected of A, but has an additional incentive to comply. This strong-
form incentive would likely not be leveled ex post without violating the 
presumption against ex post facto laws88: its utility as a stronger-than-
                                                
81 See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 30. 
82 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 86 (1983) (citing United Mine Workers v. 
Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 749 (4th Cir. 1954)) (“Where Congress has intended [to create a right 
to punitive damages] it has found no difficulty in using language appropriate to that end.”). 
83 See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 11. 
84 See id. at 59.  
85  See generally Gʀᴀᴍᴍᴀʀɪsᴛ, http://grammarist.com/style/carrot-and-stick/ (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“[In order to motivate a person] either you strike [him] with a stick 
or you urge [him] along with a carrot.”). 
86 See discussion supra pp. 20–21. 
87 No claim is made here as to the economic or social prudence of an actual rule of this 
sort: the parameters of the scenario outlined here might have an overly disincentive effect 
or otherwise cause transaction costs to spike. It is here introduced solely to illustrate the 
powerful incentive-generating effect of ex ante rules—an effect that may exist to a lesser 
degree in a safety-valve formulation relying on equitable remedies. 
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
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disgorgement remedy hinges on ex ante rulemaking. Accordingly, where 
opportunism is accompanied by serious social costs, favoring an ex ante 
strategy creates the best means of disincentivizing such grasping (i.e., 
CMO) conduct: while the definition of opportunism outlined above does not 
incorporate a finding that social costs must outweigh benefits for conduct to 
be deemed opportunistic, where such a negative dynamic exists, the model 
proposed here offers a better framework for instituting structural 
countermeasures. Equity jurisprudence cannot realistically replicate this 
same maximally deterrent effect.89 
It may be argued at this stage that the imposition of punitive 
sanctions (other than the more conceptually limited disgorgement) suffers 
from the same uncertainty problems heretofore attributed to the use of ex 
post equity. 90  “Determining punishment by the gain attributable to a 
wrong” 91  seems to intuitively possess predictability advantages over 
punitive sanctions whose calculation is derived independently of the actual 
instance of malfeasance. 
This question is properly addressed at the preceding level. The 
question is whether such a remedy will be used, rather than the precise 
character of the remedial sums awarded. The possibility of using such a 
remedy should be expressed as a property of the ex ante rules that govern 
the conduct in question.92 Under a system embracing such a rule, engaging 
in CMO renders it likely that prescribed consequences will result, and that 
such consequences possess the capacity to reach high levels. A 
disgorgement remedy might fulfill this same role—but the possibility of its 
use as a CMO countermeasure should be bound into the ex ante rule whose 
violation initially triggers legal proceedings. 93  Where deterrence is 
concerned, the possibility that punitive non-disgorgement sanctions may 
possibly exceed the costs of disgorgement creates a deterrent effect beyond 
what is achieved by a system using disgorgement alone. 
In summary, then, while CMO is conceptually distinguishable from 
general strategic conduct (opportunism in the broad sense) its existence 
                                                
89 See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 59. 
90 See id. at 4–5. 
91 Mark P. Gergen, Causation in Disgorgement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 827, 830 (2012). 
92 See Jim Rossi, Beyond Goldwasser: Ex Post Judicial Enforcement in Deregulated 
Markets, 2003 Mɪᴄʜ. Sᴛ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 717, 717 (2005) (“Ex ante rules provide forward-looking, 
predictable and clear standards . . . .”). 
93 See Gergen, supra note 91, at 830. 
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does not create a justification for the countermeasures prescribed by 
equity’s advocates,94 for the following reasons: 
 
1) Reliance interests are undermined across-the-board where the 
potential for strong ex post equitable remedies is in place. While this 
Article has argued above that it is rational to speak of CMO as a 
distinct and bounded phenomenon, judges may disagree 
(particularly given the likely dearth of relevant precedent) about 
whether a given occurrence falls within this category. Accordingly, 
a system using counter-opportunistic ex post remedies proposed is 
inherently less predictable and disincentivizes actors’ reliance. 
2) Under a system reviving the use of equity, ex ante rules lose the 
impetus toward change or reform that opportunism (both in its 
general and CMO varieties) produces. This, in turn, compromises 
any pedagogical value that such changes have on norm internalizers 
endeavoring to comply with the system’s rules of conduct. 
3) Tying possible ex post remedies to the specific misdeeds committed 
(i.e., disgorgement or restitution) results in a lack of access to 
maximally deterrent penalties that might be attached to ex ante 
rules. 95  Where disincentivizing CMO is the primary objective, 
stronger penalties (within a framework that best allows for 
predictable decision-making) are preferable. 
 
Part III, moving beyond the question of opportunism to explore 
further pragmatic alternatives to the deployment of equity, will consider 
additional ways in which equitable objectives are instantiated in ex ante 
laws, primarily through considering the role of strict-liability torts as 
counterweights to opportunistic behavior. 
III. COUNTER-OPPORTUNISM AND NORMATIVE ENTRENCHMENT 
This Part suggests that strict-liability torts constitute one example of 
a legal entrenchment of certain counter-opportunistic norms and, thereby, 
reflect an aspirational, though not adjudicatory, understanding of equity.96 
                                                
94 See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 74. 
95 Gergen, supra note 91, at 830. 
96 See supra Introduction. 
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Much debate has raged over whether torts constitute economic or 
moral harms,97 and how law should be constructed to mitigate or punish 
such harms. Without directly weighing into this debate, this Part suggests a 
complementary perspective on Tort Law. From a historical standpoint, Tort 
Law serves a signaling function. It offers a way for the values of a society, 
at a given moment in time, to be instantiated in law; it provides a snapshot 
of incentives and disincentives collectively expressed by the popular will. 
Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the case of strict-liability 
torts. After extensive experience, society determined that, in particular 
contexts, certain aspects of opportunistic behavior are socially undesirable 
(identified above as CMO). In an evolutionary paradigm such as the one 
sketched here, strict-liability torts are an advanced form of counter-
opportunist measures that are legally codified (encompassing such 
comparatively narrow categories as design defect and manufacturing defect, 
among others) after standards of proper conduct have become thoroughly 
entrenched in society. Where conduct norms based on social consensus are 
less clear, or are likely to remain persistently unclear, fault-based, 
negligence standards exist. Importantly, this observation does not require 
that a specific position be taken on whether negligent actions constitute 
moral failures (crossing the line into CMO). Rather, it simply relies upon a 
generalized cultural idea of reasonableness that may be said to exist—the 
bounds of which are inexact, but the presence of which is not. Accordingly, 
though it may not be possible to definitively entrench anti-opportunistic or 
anti-CMO norms based on a standard of reasonableness, negligence-based 
standards still constitute a form of ex ante checks on conduct (albeit more 
vague than strict-liability standards). Moreover, the ostensibly opaque 
standard of reasonableness becomes progressively clearer over time as 
additional laws develop and relevant judicial precedent accretes. 
The crucial takeaway from this analysis is that initial expectations 
for product manufacturers are made clear (or, at the very least clearer) under 
a system of unpredictable, equitable remedies based on judicial discretion. 
Manufacturers can grasp the general contours of the standards to which they 
will be subjected; these standards are uniquely linked to their particular 
                                                
97  See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability Wrongs, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014). 
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industry and practice, and are not simply generalized maxims applied to 
their conduct. 
This evolutionary, counter-opportunistic way of viewing Tort Law 
may also offer clues as to why the extant tort regime remains in place, in 
lieu of an expanded social insurance system designed to ameliorate harm to 
injured parties. The systematic evolution of Tort Law—understood as an 
ongoing process of observation, information collection, and legal 
reformation—encourages the historical development of specific, ex ante 
conduct norms that decision makers (who set the bounds of actors’ legal 
expectations) can consistently rely upon. If these norms are unclear, the 
presence of social insurance may not sufficiently disincentivize antisocial 
(CMO) conduct. From this viewpoint, Tort Law is not exclusively about 
“punishing moral wrongdoing” or “making an injured party whole,” but on 
a meta-level, about reducing conduct deemed socially undesirable98 (where 
“undesirability” is not some fixed lodestar principle). 
Strict-liability torts impose rigorous ex ante expectations on actors 
whose conduct falls within the ambit of such torts. These rigorous 
expectations, in turn, restrict the exercise of independent discretion on the 
parts of judges. From the viewpoint of an actor deciding how to behave in a 
context where rules of strict liability exist, these rules have a strongly anti-
opportunistic effect: specifically, they provide a substantial deterrent against 
CMO.99  
The codification of default rules in Contract Law serves a similar 
function. Such rules are accessible prior to an actor’s decision to contract or 
not contract and operate as an additional support for reliance interests in the 
                                                
98  See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (examining the advantages of strict liability vis-à-vis 
negligence). 
99 The possibility that a manufacturer might obtain insurance and engage in certain 
risk-taking behavior it deems to be cost-justified does not undermine this thesis. Where 
insurance and strict liability are considered in the context of opportunism, both incurring 
liability and paying out and not incurring liability are permissible non-CMO choices. An 
occurrence of CMO in this context would entail an attempt to circumvent the 
payout/insurance dynamic entirely. The purpose of a strict liability rule is to impose 
damages if certain conduct results in harm: the correct binary is not between safety and 
payout, but between safety or payout and neither safety nor payout. 
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event that drafting deficiencies within the contract itself are identified.100 
These default rules are not themselves static, but (like strict-liability torts) 
they reflect the prevalent normative consensus regarding the contracting 
process. 
At this point, an important criticism might be raised against the 
perspective outlined above. Both Tort and Contract Law are not strictly 
rule-based systems: these domains of law contain both ex ante rules and ex 
ante standards (e.g., “good faith and fair dealing”).101 Professor Arthur Leff, 
for instance, has challenged the utility of these standards.102 “[W]hen the 
question is presented as a decision as to the ‘unconscionability’ of a single 
contractual provision, the vacuousness of the standard is apparent.”103 
Elsewhere, Leff calls into question the tendency of the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s drafters to “increase the abstraction level of the 
drafting and explaining language”104 in order to produce “an emotionally 
satisfying incantation.”105 
In view of Leff’s critique, where judicial rulings are based not on ex 
ante rules, but on ex ante standards, the question is whether the 
indeterminacy problem outlined above is simply more obscured. Or, put 
another way, is judicial discretion regarding standards likely to be as 
potentially unpredictable as it might be under a system overtly embracing 
discrete principles of equity? Leff raises a particularly salient objection to 
such standards.106 “When the key evaluative word, however, is a description 
of the judge’s own state of mind [i.e., too expensive] rather than of the 
situation which might be justified in producing such a state, the likelihood 
that the court will even examine the relevant questions is severely 
lessened.”107 
                                                
100 See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing in depth the 
characteristics of default rules when contracting). 
101 See Hometown Folks, LLC v. S & B Wilson, Inc., 643 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 
2011) (“The duty of good faith and fair dealing requires parties to a contract to conduct 
themselves fairly and responsibly.”). 
102 Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause, 
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 541 (1967). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 558. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 551.  
107 Id.  
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There are two possible avenues for answering this dilemma. The 
former weighs the relative utilities of ex ante and ex post standards, while 
the latter addresses the intrinsic and unavoidable vagueness of standards in 
general. Each shall be considered in turn. 
A. Relative Utility Framework: If the continuing use of necessarily 
indeterminate standards is taken as a given, three reasons suggest that ex 
ante standards are preferable to ex post standards. 
 
1) Institutional Constraints Favor Limited Principles. Law crafters 
have at least some structural incentive toward restraint in the process 
of formulating standards. In order to pass laws, they must build 
consensus with other legislators, many of whom will have 
constituents whose lives will be adversely affected by overbroad 
limiting schemes. As discussed previously, the deliberative process 
can have a tempering effect, which contributes to the quality of the 
ultimate product.  
2) Standards Likely More Tailored than Ex Post Maxims. Even 
imperfectly constructed ex ante standards are still likely to be more 
limited than general equitable maxims. Even a standard as 
seemingly vague as reasonableness is likely to include, in some 
form, external referents by means of which it may be defined more 
precisely. These referents may take many possible forms, from 
materials produced during legislative deliberations to those values 
expressed in the legal literature of the time; relatively speaking, 
however, they bear at least some connection to observable practices. 
From the perspective of an ex ante decision-maker, this standard is 
preferable to an abstracted moral imperative lacking contextual 
clarifiers.108 
3) Cabining Effect of Precedent. In the context of judicial 
interpretation of standards, precedent has a binding effect; this not 
only allows ex ante reliance on past interpretive precedents, but also 
enables persistently problematic standards to be clarified and revised 
by the crafters of law—again, a testament to the view that law ought 
to be viewed as evolutionary rather than static. Conversely, 
                                                
108 See Lane v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 145 S.E. 196, 207 (S.C. 1928) (“Equity will not 
suffer a wrong without a remedy.”). 
 
94 OPPORTUNISM AS CRUCIBLE Vol. 1 
precedent may exemplify a given equitable norm, but does not bind 
its subsequent invocations—after all, the utility of equity emerges 
from its role as an ex post remedy. Thus, where reliance interests 
and the evolution of law are concerned, even imperfect ex ante 
standards are preferable to ex post equity judgments. The goals 
reflected in the normative judgments that are made by society (both 
at the legislative level and the level of their constituents) may be 
described, broadly, as equitable. These judgments inform which 
rules and standards become legally and culturally entrenched over 
time. In view of Leff’s critique, then, precedent works to restrict the 
degree to which a “judge’s own state of mind”109 impacts the 
ultimate judgment handed down. The ex ante/ex post distinction, 
however, is critical: equity as understood in the ex ante context 
refers to a generalized, if somewhat indeterminate, moral objective, 
whereas equity in the ex post context refers to acts of judicial gap-
filling in accord with the maxims of equity. Such gap-filling by the 
judiciary, where not closely consonant with the ex ante laws in 
question, stymies the evolution of the law itself. 
 
B. Intrinsic Vagueness Framework: One might reject the heretofore-
sketched idea of a continuum of determinacy by which individuals may be 
more or less able to predict the legal outcomes of particular actions. For 
instance, requirements foreclosing bad faith in contract dealing are broadly 
established as ex ante standards110: is it possible to anticipate, as a party 
contemplating entering an agreement, whether one will be subsequently 
charged with bad faith in the deal-making process? It would appear, 
proponents of a non-continuum-oriented view might charge, that on balance 
a system favoring ex ante rulemaking is no less subject to the uncertainty-
based pitfalls faced by a system incorporating ex post equitable remedies. 
In response, it first bears note that indeterminacy in norm-setting is 
problematic whether it occurs ex ante or ex post,111 and such indeterminacy 
adversely implicates reliance interests in both cases. Moreover, actions 
occurring within the domain of a badly bounded law also offer little in the 
                                                
109 See Leff, supra note 102, at 551. 
110See generally Bad Faith Tort Remedy for Breach of Contract, 34 AM. JUR. TRIALS 
343 (2015) (regarding the rules governing bad faith).  
111 See Leff, supra note 102, at 542. 
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way of meaningful information for those seeking to construct meaningfully 
specific laws. Accordingly, the objector’s point is well taken: a law that 
affords excessive interpretive discretion (including by way of over-vague 
standards) is problematic and should likely be more closely tailored.112 
Some standards will, assuredly, be either overinclusive or underinclusive, 
but unlike the traditional equitable maxims (whose persistence in the 
common law, in some general form, is offered by Professor Smith as a 
grounds for asserting their continuing utility),113 ex ante standards can be 
more precisely calibrated. Instances may exist where this calibration fails to 
occur, but the possibility of doing so remains available in relative 
perpetuity. 
That being said, within a framework that has rejected ex post equity 
in favor of ex ante rules and standards, the existence of close cases where 
outcome indeterminacy persists does not itself constitute an affirmative 
argument for the use of ex post equity. All proceedings will not be close 
cases hinging on a finding of good faith versus bad faith; where the law that 
determines an outcome is not itself closely contingent on the interpretation 
of a particular standard, equity should not be invoked ex post to ameliorate 
an outcome deemed undesirable. 114  In short, a degree of unavoidable 
indeterminacy may persist (particularly in areas where rule crafters display 
a tendency to favor standards over rules), but at the very least, 
indeterminacy arising from ex ante standards (as opposed to general 
equitable maxims) likely exists within narrower discretionary bounds: the 
substantive ex ante doctrines from which a judge may reason are generally 
fleshed out to a greater degree than are the maxims of equity, enhancing the 
possibility of meaningful reliance. 
Moving beyond these arguments from pragmatic impact, the 
Conclusion addresses the moral questions surrounding opportunism and 
equity, and offers a justification for the paradigmatic framework through 
which the foregoing analysis has unfolded, before ending with an argument 
for rethinking the intersection of law and equity.  
                                                
112 See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (considering the difficulties 
posed by a statute suffering from overbroad interpretive leeway). 
113 Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 17; cf. Roscoe Pound, The Decadence 
of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 20–26 (1905) (arguing that the system of equity and the 
system of law will inevitably blend into one system). 
114 See e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
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CONCLUSION: THE MORAL QUANDARY OF OPPORTUNISM 
Throughout the preceding analysis, this Article does not seek to 
justify or validate opportunistic practice—nor CMO in particular—as an 
intrinsic moral good. This Article’s scope is limited to offering a functional 
theory of opportunism (in both its generalized and CMO forms) as a trigger 
for legal evolution, as well as a normative case that ex ante laws are 
generally preferable to the use of ex post equity (where reliance interests 
and effective development of law over time are the key evaluative criteria). 
This Article has previously described opportunism as amoral; this 
should be understood as contending that opportunism as defined here—self-
interested behavior that is legal but unanticipated—is amoral in itself, but 
may be immoral in a given context. Casting all forms of opportunism as 
intrinsically immoral risks, as previously discussed, rendering opportunism 
a non-cognizable phenomenon: it is no easy feat to accurately discern the 
motives behind a given norm. Definitions of opportunism must thus 
differentiate between generally strategic conduct, which may not be 
harmful, and the morally problematic phenomenon that is CMO. 
Professor Smith writes, “Models of self-interest combined with 
asymmetric information can explain a lot of the behavior we would call 
opportunistic. Also, if opportunism is simply playing outside the rules then 
it reduces to imperfect enforcement.”115 This characterization insinuates that 
self-interested behavior, in areas where the law has not explicitly regulated, 
is in some way immoral or socially destructive—an assumption that is not 
substantiated in depth—yet the characterization also recognizes that some 
forms of self-interest-seeking behavior are especially pernicious. While 
legal conduct and moral conduct may well be at odds, this does not 
necessitate that extra-legal conduct is always immoral. The kind of behavior 
challenged by Professors Smith116 and Williamson117 involves conduct that 
is broadly antagonistic to the anticipated effect of a given law—conduct 
here termed CMO. The equitable countermeasures proposed by counter-
opportunistic theorists, however, adversely impact both general 
opportunism (which one might also describe as “strategic behavior”) and 
                                                
115 Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 9. 
116 See id. at 17. 
117 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 15. 
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CMO: though CMO should indeed be policed, for both moral and practical 
reasons, a different solution is required. 
To revisit the hypothetical case of Malevolent Motors, an 
appropriate avenue for counteracting the company’s CMO behavior could 
take the form of a newly enhanced ex ante law regulating driver-for-hire 
services above and beyond taxicab companies. Crucially, the need to 
expand this law would likely not have been clear without Malevolent 
Motors’ conduct actually occurring and being identified as harmful; the 
very essence of Malevolent Motors’ conduct is that it was unanticipated. 
Penalties for violation of the law might be attached to this enhanced ex ante 
rule, which in turn could carry a punitive force beyond disgorgement of 
illicitly reaped profits. This would have the effect of maximally deterring 
Malevolent Motors’ undesirable conduct without triggering the trapdoor 
effects of equity. Moreover, a rule evolving in this sort would not 
automatically disincentivize strategic (non-CMO) behavior: a company 
operating within legal loopholes, in a socially advantageous way, could still 
do so without the immediate fear of an adverse judgment in equity. 
A brief note on the scheme of legal philosophy within which this 
analysis exists: the evolutionary portrait of law outlined here exists 
generally within the contours of the positivist tradition.118 From a meta-
ethical standpoint, however, the process by which law changes to reflect 
changes in social values may well reflect an ever-increasing cognizance of 
the higher norms that exist within a realist framework. Ergo, to recognize 
the phenomenon of opportunism as a driver of important structural changes 
in law is not to automatically espouse a utilitarian morality. 119 
Simply put, that conduct which is socially destructive or bad—
conduct that likely falls within the boundaries of CMO—should be 
addressed at the ex ante level. The acts of agents engaging in forms of 
opportunism, whether benign or CMO, determine what society labels as 
socially destructive or elects to permit; such determinations are then 
codified via the legislative apparatus. Additionally, as discussed above, 
such a process allows for the attachment of non-disgorgement punitive 
sanctions to the rule set deployed. This is the crucial point where Professor 
                                                
118 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012) (outlining the 
broad paradigms of the legal positivist tradition). 
119 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (George Sher eds. 2d ed., 2001) 
(regarding utilitarian moral theory).  
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Smith’s analysis encounters argumentative difficulties.120 He writes, “There 
is little to be gained and much to be lost by allowing people to easily 
contract around an equitable safety valve.”121 Indeed, some norms must 
govern the process by which contracts are formulated, but such norms are 
rendered more specific and more effective as information enters the system 
and instances of opportunistic conduct (including cases of CMO) are 
repeatedly adjudicated. The ex ante structures established through such a 
process may work to achieve equitable, counter-CMO ends—for instance, 
as in Riggs, by preventing a wrongdoer from being enriched by his 
misdeeds122—without the need for ex post equity (even as a “safety 
valve”).123 The very presence of this safety valve defuses any momentum 
toward reform of the ex ante processes and norms.124 Where fighting CMO 
is the goal, precision in rule setting is acutely important, and that precision 
is best achieved by ensuring that rule-makers have access to information 
regarding the behavior of self-interested actors. 
A final word is warranted on the broad trajectory of law and equity 
in light of this evolutionary portrait. From a perspective that recognizes the 
inevitability of normative change over time, separating law and equity into 
distinct judicial tools (and using both interchangeably as discrete 
instruments, invoking equity when a situation is assessed to be 
“problematically opportunistic”) is the least desirable scenario. This not 
only disincentivizes reliance, given that assumptions made based on ex ante 
legal rules and standards may be invalidated by ex post acts of judicial 
discretion, but it also offers no structural incentive for laws to develop. 
Integrating the use of both law and equity, as contemporary courts have 
generally done, is preferable to their explicit separation, but it may have the 
effect of obscuring (by committing to ex post judicial discretion) areas 
where the law itself should evolve via the conventional lawmaking process. 
The conceptual framework proposed here, which challenges the 
argumentative rationales for employing ex post equity, provides for the 
incorporation of punitive sanctions as a strong deterrent against socially 
                                                
120 See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 50. 
121 Id. 
122 Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889). 
123 See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 6. 
124 See generally Stone, supra note 67, at 4–5. 
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adverse conduct—sanctions which must be meaningfully attached to ex ante 
requirements in order to remain philosophically defensible. 
The optimal scenario entails a translation of the moral goals sought 
by equity—suppression of CMO conduct—into the discursive process of 
lawmaking at an ex ante level. In this vision, equity is understood not as an 
actual instrument used to sidestep a “bad” judicial outcome, but rather as a 
more abstracted aim that may underpin the formulation of ex ante rules in 
order to thwart perpetrators of CMO. What is needed is not second-order 
law but second-order architecture—law crafted in accordance with popular 
normative expectations to achieve equitable outcomes. If law is ultimately 
to flourish and respond to changing cultural needs, it must evolve within a 
society that seeks, but does not seek to do, equity. 
